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RECENT DECISIONS
Federal Income Taxation: Deferred Compensation Agreements
and the Doctrine of Constructive Receipt-Petitioner was a high
salaried executive of Briggs Corporation. In October, 1952, peti-
tioner and Briggs executed an employment contract which includ-
ed a plan for deferred compensation to be paid to petitioner after
his retirement or when he reached age sixty-five, whichever event
occurred first. In December, 1953, Briggs sold the major portion
of its manufacturing facilities to Chrysler Corporation, and peti-
tioner, being no longer needed on a full time basis by Briggs, was
employed in the same capacity by Chrysler. In complete satisfac-
tion of its employment contract with petitioner, Briggs agreed to
pay to a trustee $90,000, in installments of not less than $1,500 per
month, in consideration for which petitioner agreed to be available
on a part time basis in an advisory and consulting capacity and
not to accept other employment inconsistent with that of Briggs.
When petitioner retired from full time employment with Chrysler
or when he reached age sixty-five, he was to receive from the
trustee $1,500 per month until the trust funds were exhausted.
Briggs was willing to pay petitioner directly but the plan involv-
ing payments to a trustee was suggested by petitioner.
Payments under this contract commenced in February, 1954 and
each month thereafter during 1954 and 1955, Briggs paid $1,500 less
withholding tax to the trustee, charging the payments to salary expense
during those years. Petitioner, a cash basis taxpayer, did not include
those payments in his gross income for 1954 or 1955, but did claim
a tax credit for the amounts withheld by Briggs. The Commissioner
determined that these payments were taxable to the petitioner in the
years they were paid by Briggs to the trustee. Held: Judgment for the
Commissioner; The attempted trust arrangement had no substantive
effect. Because Briggs was willing to pay petitioner directly, he con-
structively received the income at the time it was paid into the trust.
The trustee was simply acting as petitioner's designated agent to re-
ceive the payments for him. George W. Drysdale, 32 T.C. No. 37
(1959, now on appeal to the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals.
The doctrine of constructive receipt is not contained in the Code.
However it has been present in the Treasury Regulations almost since
the sixteenth amendment was passed. It was initially promulgated in
Regulations forty-five, Article fifty-three under the Revenue Act of
1918 and remained unchanged in verbiage1 until the Regulations under
'Treas. Reg. 62, art. 52 (1921)
Treas. Reg. 65, art.51 (1924)
Treas. Reg. 69, art. 51 (1926)
Treas. Reg. 74, art. 332 (1928)
Treas. Reg. 77, art. 332 (1932)
Treas. Reg. 86, art. 42-2 (1934)
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the Revenue Code of 1954 rearranged the form but left the substance
intact.2 Generally, the two tests that must be met in order to establish
a constructive receipt are (1) the income is credited to the taxpayer's
account or otherwise set apart for him, and (2) the income must be
free from any substantial limitations or restrictions as to the time,
manner or conditions of payment.
Although the doctrine originated as an administrative interpreta-
tion, it has been applied by the courts in a long string of decisions.
Probably the first case to apply it was John A. Brander,3 in which the
president of a corporation who had accrued salary credited to him on
the corporate books, but refused to withdraw it, was held to have con-
structively received the salary in the year in which it was credited to
his account.4 Other early cases which follow in the classic mold estab-
lished by the Regulations,' are Corliss v. Bowers' where taxpayer
attempted to set up a trust for the benefit of his family and retained
the power to revoke or alter the trust; and Loose v. United States7
where interest coupons that had matured before the holder's death
but were cashed thereafter by his widow were determined to be income
to the decedent during his life.
As early as 1934 the Internal Revenue Service was apparently try-
ing to expand the scope of the doctrine. In Commissioner v. Tyler'
the court, emphasizing the "no substantial limitation" aspect of the
rule, found that, contra to the Commissioner's position, income from
the sale of stock placed in escrow and under the terms of the escrow
agreement, not receivable by taxpayers until the following year, was
taxable income to them in the year actually received by the taxpayers,
and not in the year when the money was placed with the depositary.
Treas. Reg .94, art. 42-2 (1936)
Treas. Reg. 101, art. 42-2 (1938)
Treas. Reg. 103, §19.42-2 (1940)
Treas. Reg. 111, §29.42-2 (1941)
Treas. Reg. 118, §39.42-2 (1951)
Treas. Reg. §1.451-2(a) (1954).
2 The present regulation on this subject, Treas. Reg. §1.451-2(a) on which the
court in the Drysdale case relies is only slightly changed from Treas. Reg.
118 § 39.42-2 and others preceding it. See note 1 supra.
33 B.T.A. 231 (1925).
4 The court, even in this early case, while citing article 53 of Regulations 45,
emphasizes the fact that constructive receipt is an artifice to be applied spar-
ingly lest it become a means for taxing something other than income and thus
violating the constitution itself.
5 Treas. Reg. §1.451-2(b) gives the more common examples of income construc-
tively received: bond interest coupons which have matured, stock dividends
unqualifiedly made available to the stockholder, and interest credited on sav-
ings bank deposits.6 281 U.S. 376 (1930) in which Justice Holmes stated the basis for applying the
doctrine, "The income which is subject to a man's unfettered command and
that he is free to enjoy at his own option may be taxed to him as his income
whether he sees fit to enjoy it or not."
774 F. 2d 147 (8th Cir. 1934).
8 72 F. 2d 950 (3d Cir. 1934).
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Since 1934 there have been several similar cases. They fell generally
into two classes, deferral of payment for personal services, and defer-
ral of payment of the proceeds from a sale of personalty.
An example of the first category is Clifton B. Russell.0 In 1941
petitioner Russell was voted a bonus of $50,000 "payable when the
treasurer of the Corporation in his sole discretion may determine."' 0
The Treasurer paid petitioner $25,000 in 1941 and placed the remainder
in trust for him in 1942. The tax court held that the portion placed
in trust was neither actually nor constructively received in 1941, again
the decisive factor being non-availability of the bonus.
In J. D. Amend" the petitioner was a wheat farmer who habitually
sold for delivery and payment in the year succeeding that in which
the contract was signed. The Commissioner contended that because
the petitioner could have sold his wheat for cash that he constructively
received the proceeds in the year of sale. The court found for the
petitioner, that since the sales contracts were bonafide arms-length
transactions 12 and petitioner bad no control over the proceeds, he could
not be taxed for them until the year of actual receipt.13
Estate of Richards v. Commissioner4 involved a fact situation close-
ly paralleling that in the Drysdale case. There the taxpayer had obtained
0 5 T.C. 974 (1945).
10 A similar fact situation existed in Gearge W. Johnson, 25 T.C. 499 (1955)
where petitioners, all officers and stockholders in their company, received
salary checks and mutually agreed not to cash them until the company presi-
dent advised them to do so. It was held the checks were not taxable until
such permission was received from the president. In this case and some
others, notably Charles K. Thurston, 22 B.T.A. 1062 (1931) the fact that there
were insufficient funds in the company treasury to pay the accrued salaries
was at least partially responsible for a decision of no constructive receipt.
11 13 T.C. 178 (1949).
12 It is on this basis that the court distinguishes the Drysdale case from James
F. Oates, 18 T.C. 570 aff'd 207 F. 2d 711 (7th Cr. 1935) which holds that
employer and employee may amend their original employment contract so as
to have the income spread over a longer period of time than provided for by
the original contract. Quoting from Drysdale: "The Oates case involved . . .
a mutually advantageous bonafide agreement reached through arms-length
bargaining.... It should be noted that the agreement had a legitimate busi-
ness purpose aside from the fact that it enabled the agents to defer their
reporting of income.
"In the instant case however, the only apparent purpose for Briggs mak-
ing the payments to the trustee . . . was to reduce petitioner's tax burden."
That a business 'purpose on the part of the company in Oates was a moving
factor in the decision is not apparent to the writer. It appears that the deci-
sion there is based almost solely on the fact that petitioners had no rights to
the other income at all until they actually received it, at which time they
included it in gross income.
13 That the government now regards this case as good law is implied in a 1958
ruling:
"The proceeds from the sale of wheat by a farmer using the cash receipts
and disbursements method of accounting under a bonafide arm's-length
contract callng for payment in the taxable year following that in which the
wheat was delivered to the purchaser, are includable in his gross income
for the taxable year in which payment is received."
Rev. Rul. 58-162, 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 234.14 150 F. 2d 837 (2d Cir. 1945).
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a lower court judgment of $381,000. While appeals were pending, two
defendants offered to settle for $100,000 apiece. The taxpayer accepted
one offer in December, 1936 but refused as to the other in order to
reduce his taxes in 1936. In January, 1937, taxpayer accepted the
other defendant's offer. The commissioner attempted to have the
settlements both taxed in 1936. In holding contra to the commissioner,
the court determined that nothing was credited or set apart for the
taxpayer which he could draw on in 1936 so that the applicable regu-
lation's 15 requirements clearly were not complied with. It is interesting
to note that the factor so much relied on by the tax court in the
Drysdale case, that the taxpayer could have had the money immedi-
ately had he so desired, was not considered controlling in the Richards
case."
In 1955 there occurred what appears to be the first major gravita-
tion by the courts away from the strict fact situation previously re-
quired for the application of the doctrine. In Williams v. United
States1 7 the taxpayer sold some timber to a purchaser who, at the
seller's request, placed the purchase price in escrow with an agreement
that the bank holding the money could only pay one-fifth of the
amount to the seller in each of five consecutive years following the
year in which the contract was made. In a remarkable about-face from
the Tyler18 and Richards19 decisions, the court determined that as a
matter of law, petitioner had constructively received the purchase price
in the year of sale because the purchaser had been willing to pay him
directly. So far as this writer can determine, there was no warning
for this sharp break from the traditionally understood constructive
receipt situation, where control of the income by the taxpayer was
essential for application. 20 Since the Williams case there have been at
least two other instances2 ' of courts approving this extension.
In the Drysdale situation the court might have found an easier way
out simply by applying section 402(b) of the Code since the payments
were made to a trust.' 2 But the actual decision raises the question of
15 Treas. Reg. 111 § 29.42-2.
IG Cf. Well v .Commissioner, 173 F. 2d 805 (2d Cir. 1949).
17 219 F. 2d 523 (5th Cir. 1955).
is See note 8, supra.
19 See note 14, supra. Although both these cases and several others in point
were cited by petitioner, all were passed over by Chief Judge Hutcheson
in his opinion and no attempt was made to distinguish them.
20 Earlier, another method had been employed to skirt the element of availability.
The "cash equivalent" doctrine, as exemplified in E. T. Sproull, 16 T.C. 244(1951) aff'd 194 F. 2d 541 (6th Cir. 1951) may be applied where money was
paid out by the company into a trust and was irretrievable by the company
but still not presently accessible to the employee. The theory behind this
doctrine is that although the employee has no access to the money presently,
there still has been an economic benefit conferred on him to the extent of the
amount deposited.
21 In the Drysdale case and in Frank Cowden, 32 T.C. No. 73 (1959).
22 The omission of mention of this section in the briefs was questioned by the
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whether all courts will now consistently recognize the extension made
in the constructive receipt doctrine or are Drysdale and Williams to be
considered isolated fact situations with the doctrine still generally to be
confined to the traditional circumstances? If the Drysdale case is
generally accepted, what danger does it offer to the traditional deferred
compensation plan? A somewhat typical example of this sort of plan
is the original contract of employment in the Drysdale case. It pro-
vided, in addition to current compensation, that on Drysdale's retire-
ment or when he reached age sixty-five, whichever event occurred
sooner, he would be paid not less than $1,500 monthly for the next ten
years and in the event of his death during that time, the payments were
to be made to either his administrator or some party designated in his
will. In return for this Drysdale was to be available in an advisory
and consulting capacity, so long as he remained alive and mentally and
physically able, and was not to accept employment inconsistent with
that of Briggs. In order to distinguish this original contract from the
one condemned in the case, two factual differences should be noted
between them. In the original contract, although the record does not
show who suggested the deferred payments, no provision was made for
the use of a trust. In the contract as amended, the payments were to
be made currently to the trustee and Briggs deducted them as salary
expense. Also under the first plan the company continued to pay
Drysdale a regular salary for his present services so that it could not
readily be determined just how much of the deferred amount was
compensation for these services and how much was for the services
to be performed after retirement. After Briggs sold out to Chrysler,
Drysdale was paid nothing directly for current services performed for
Briggs so that the commissioner could and aid determine that the
entire amount paid to the trustee was really remuneration for services
performed concurrently. With the aid of oral testimony to that effect
from an officer of Briggs,23 the court upheld this determination. The
amended contract and any comparable agreement involving a non-for-
feitable interest in a trust would not effectively defer taxation of the
employer's contributions.24 But because of the aforementioned factors
court, but it refrained from using the section initially. A possible explanation
for this is that since Drysdale was not employed on a full time basis by
Briggs Corporation, the court may have hesitated to classify Drysdale as an
employee (as opposed to an independent contractor). Only employees are
included in the wording of the code section.
23 A vice-president of the company, on the trial of the matter, testified that
Briggs would have been willing to pay the cash to Drysdale directly, but at the
latter's suggestion the trust was set up.
24 If not because barred by the constructive receipt doctrine, then under the
sections of the code pertaining to non-qualified trusts (Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 402(b) and to non-exempt annuities (§ 403(c)). But a plan of fund-
ing through insurance that is not irrevocable is not necessarily fatal. In Casale
v. Commissioner, 247 F. 2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957) taxpayer held 98% of the
stock of a corporation that made annual payments on an insurance policy
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the original contract, had it remained in existence, would have had a
good chance of succeeding as intended. It appears that any individual
deferred compensation plan that is not specially funded could not be
taxed to the employee until such time as he actually received the pay-
ments and the company would be able to deduct the payments at that
time as well.2 5
If the reasoning in the Drysdale case is followed literally and the
willingness of the employer to pay the employee currently and directly
for services rendered currently is generally accepted as a criterion for
constructive receipt, then the commissioner will be in a position to
contend that many non-qualified 2G deferred compensation plans are not
effective tax-wise. But where the employee is receiving a current salary
for regular services performed, it would be a practical impossibility
for the government to determine and prove what portion of the de-
ferred benefits the employer would have been willing to pay the em-
ployee directly, had the employee so requested it. Presumably the em-
ployer would state that any subsequent payments are contingent on the
employee's complying with the requirements of the contract after his
retirement.
However, even if the doctrine of constructive receipt is not a fatal
obstacle to the use of the traditional deferred compensation plan, the
attorney must bear in mind that there are other methods of taxing
deferred payments currently27 He can be fairly certain though, that
courts which have for thirty years and more preached a sparse applica-
tion of the doctrine of constructive receipt are not likely to consent to
such a wholesale expansion of that doctrine.
Louis W. STAUDENM'AIER, JR.
insuring the taxpayer's life for the benefit of the corporation and which pro-
vided that when taxpayer reached age sixty-five and the policy matured, he
should receive monthly payments from it. The corporation had the right to
assign the policy and change the beneficiary. The court found that the cor-
poration was not merely an alter ego of the taxpayer and that the premium
payments made by the corporation did not constitute a taxable dividend to
the taxpayer in the year of payment. This decision has been acquiesced in
by the commissioner. Rev. Rul. 59-184, 4 P-H 1959 Fed. Tax. Serv. 54,709.
2., Int. Rev. Code of 1954 §404(a) (5).
26 i.e., not approved under § 401 (a) of the Int. Rev. Code of 1954.
27 See notes 20 and 24, supra.
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